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  The Impact of Broccoli II & Tomato II on European patents in 
conventional breeding, GMO’s and Synthetic Biology: The grand 
finale of a juicy patents tale?  
 
Timo Minssen & Ana Nordberg  
 
Abstract: 
On 25 March 2015, the Enlarged Board of Appeal of the European Patent Office (EBA) finally delivered 
its’ much awaited decisions on the consolidated referrals G2/12 (“Tomato II”) and G2/13 (“Broccoli II”). 
The EBA affirmed that products, namely plants or parts thereof, obtained by essentially biological 
processes are – unlike individual plant varieties – principally patentable under the European Patent 
Convention (EPC). This decision leaves considerable leeway for patenting novel and inventive plants and 
products thereof, which have been produced by “conventional” methods including breeding steps. The 
EBA has also clarified that this applies irrespective of if such claims are formulated in a product-by-
process format or as a per se product . Moreover, the combined effect of Broccoli & Tomato I & II opens 
new opportunities for patenting GMOs - provided that all other patent criteria are also met. This generally 
appears to be "good news" for innovative plant breeders and agrochemical companies. However, caveat 
needs to be added: Major industry players had challenged the relevant patent-claims and the EBA's 
decision(s) remain very controversial. It is, for example, very uncertain how the CJEU would decide if 
confronted with similar issues in the context of national implementations of the Biotech Directive, which 
have taken a very different view than the EBA. Moreover, the fierce European opposition against 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and Synthetic Biology remains a major challenge to the industry, 
research and innovation in an increasingly significant area of science and debate. 
 
Please note that recent developments until July 2017 have been added in a Post Scriptum section. 
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Introduction 
 For several years, the European patent and plant science communities have been captivated by 
a long, controversial and sometimes even emotional tale, featuring in the leading roles the so-called 
“Broccoli” and “Tomato” patents. On March 25, 2015, the EBA of the European Patent Office 
(EBA) delivered its much awaited decisions on the consolidated referrals G2/12 (“Tomato II”) and 
G2/13 (“Broccoli II”), clarifying the exclusion from patentability of essentially biological 
processes, such as conventional crossing and selection, and in particular its impact on the 
patentability of claims for products resulting from such processes. The so-called “Tomato II” case 
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concerned an invention entitled “method for breeding tomatoes having reduced water content and 
product of the method,”1 whereas the so-called “Broccoli II” case involved an invention of a 
“method for selective increase of the anticarcinogenic glucosinolates in brassica species”.2   
The first chapter of this complex cases - ‘Broccoli I’ and ‘Tomato I’ - clarified issues 
regarding the patentability of genetically modified organisms. As a result, claims to transgenic 
plants (or animals) generally do not face objections under Article 53 (b) EPC3 as long as these are 
carefully drafted at a higher taxonomic level, i.e. higher than a single plant variety, and even if such 
claims may embrace plant or animal varieties.4 On the contrary, claims directed to individual plant 
or animal varieties or essentially biological processes for the production of plants, including steps of 
conventional methods for the breeding of plant varieties, had been generally held non-patentable.5 
However, it still remained to be determined, whether Article 53 (b) EPC also excluded the 
patentability of product claims and so-called product-by-process claims resulting from such 
excluded processes.  
In “Tomato II” and “Broccoli II” the EBA finally confirmed unambiguously that plants or 
seeds obtained through such excluded processes are – in contrast to individual plant varieties 
patentable. Moreover, the EBA clarified that this applies even if such claims are formulated in a 
product-by-process format. Although major industry players had challenged the relevant patent-
claims, the outcome is generally favourable to innovative plant breeders and agrochemical 
companies. As we will point out further below, it might even affect GMOs and Synthetic Biology, 
due to the increasing combination of conventional and microbiological techniques. So these 
stakeholders appear at least to have won a battle, but have they won the war?   
After all, it should be remembered that relentless European and global opposition against the 
patentability of plants and plant material produced by conventional methods persists. This is also 
reflected by the decision of several national legislators to explicitly exlude the patentability of such 
products. Moreover,vigorous protests against the patentability and commercialization of genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs) and Synthetic Biology remain a major obstacle to the development of 
the industry, research and innovation in this increasingly relevant sector.  
The persisting controversy is also reflected in the major disparities that still exist among 
different jurisdictions on both the European and international level. Notwithstanding an overall 
tendency towards worldwide harmonization in patent law, this crystallizes in particular in the 
context of biotechnological inventions.6 In this area the TRIPS agreement stimulates a diverse 
development of the law and permits TRIPS member states to employ various options to various 
                                                     
1 Decision of the Enlarged Board of Appeal of 25 March 2015, G 2/12, available at 
<https://register.epo.org/application?documentId=EXBZW10W4599684&number=EP00940724&lng=en&npl=false> 
(accessed 20 May 2015). 
2 Decision of the Enlarged Board of Appeal of 25 March 2015, G 1/13, available at: 
<https://register.epo.org/application?documentId=EXBZX31D2974684&number=EP99915886&lng=en&npl=false> 
(accessed 20 May 2015). 
3 In this paper we mainly address issues pertaining to patentability of plants and plant material, however it should be 
noted that Article 53 (b) EPC also applies to the animal kingdom, and thus some of our conclusions may equally apply 
to genetic modified non-human animals. 
4 G 2/07 Broccoli/Plant Bioscience OJ EPO 2012, 130 and G 1/08 Tomatoes/State of Israel, OJ EPO 2012, 130. See 
also Decision of the Enlarged Board of Appeal dated 20 December 1999 in G 1/98 Transgenic plant/NOVARTIS II , 
Official Journal EPO, 3/2000, at p.111. 
5 G 2/07 Broccoli/Plant Bioscience OJ EPO 2012, 130 and G 1/08 Tomatoes/State of Israel OJ EPO 2012, 130, 206 
6 Zimmer F.J.., &  Grammel M., Plant Patents in Europe,  Biotechnology Law Report. August 2015, 34(4): 121-131 
(121). doi:10.1089/blr.2015.29006.fjz.  
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degrees7. Provided that member states guarantee the protection of plant varieties, either by patents 
or by a sui generis system or by a combination of the two, Article 27(3)(b) of the TRIPS agreement8 
explicitly allows member states to exclude plants from patentability and essentially biological 
processes for the production of plants. Hence some South American countries, China and the Indian 
Patent Act9 take a very restrictive approach,. These countries exclude certain biotechnological 
subject matter, and especially plant-related inventions, from patentability.10 In contrast, the US 
patent act is (still) far more permissive and includes no explicit statutory exemption of plant-related 
inventions. These may be protected by utility patents if all other patentability requirements are met. 
Not only claims directed to plants as such, but also plant parts, such as seeds and seedlings, and 
methods for the production of plants can principally be protected. This approach is inter alia based 
on the US Supreme Court decided in Diamond v. Chakrabarty11, which already in 1980 held that 
genetically modified organisms constitute patent-eligible composition of matter in accordance with 
35 U.S.C. § 101. Susequently, the Supeme Court explicitly confirmed in J.E.M. Ag Supply v. 
Pioneer Hi-Bred12 the longstanding practice of the US Patent and Trademark Office to grant utility 
patents on plants.13 The significance of these global controversies and international  legislative 
differences, i.e. not only for the evolution of already existing applications, such as food-production 
and bio-fuels, but also for rapidly emerging fields of science with an enormous potential, such as 
gene-editing (CRISPR) and biomedical innovations, should therefore not be underestimated.  
In the following, we will demonstrate how the EPO now appears to have chosen a middle-
position, which differs substantially from some national legislations. In that context it should be 
noted that the procedural history of the Broccoli and Tomato saga is quite unique, since it was for 
the first time that the same consolidated cases were considered twice by the Enlarged Board. 
Moreover, the European legal framework, as well at the institutional and technical context of these 
cases is complex, which still leaves many questions open for debate. Accordingly, section 1 of this 
paper will first provide a brief description of the European legal framework under the European 
Patent Convention (EPC)14 and the Biotech Directive15 and explain the institutional relationship 
between the relevant actors. This is followed by section 2, which delivers an account of the 
procedural history and the main arguments of the various parties to the case. Section 3 will then 
briefly summarize the decisions. This provides the basis for section 4, where we analyse the legal 
effects and the practical implications of the decision. We will also explain why the affirmed 
patentability of product and product-by process claims resulting from conventional methods might 
                                                     
7 Janis, Mark D. "Patenting Plants: A Comparative Synthesis." In Patent Law in Global Perspective, by Okediji, Ruth 
L., and Margo A. Bagley, eds., edited by Ruth L. Okediji, and Margo A. Bagley. New York: Oxford University Press, 
2014. Oxford Scholarship Online, 2014. doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199334278.003.0008, at I.. 
8 AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS administered 
through the World Trade Organization, which went into force on January 01, 1995; available at: 
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf  (accessed 10 March 2015). 
9 Sec. 3 lit. h & j of The Indian Patent Act; http://www.ipindia.nic.in/IPActs_Rules/updated_Version/sections/ps3.html  
(excluding from patentability methods of agriculture or horticulture, plants in whole or parts thereof, and essentially 
biological processes for the production of plants). 
10 Zimmer F.J.., &  Grammel M., supra n. 6 at 121-122 referring to Janis, Mark D., supra n. 7,  at I.C. 
11 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
12 J. E. M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001). 
13 See also Zimmer F.J.., &  Grammel M., supra n. 6 at 121-122. 
14 Convention on the grant of European patents (EPC) of October 5, 1973 as revised by the Act revising art. 63 EPC of 
December 17, 1991 and the Act Revising the EPC of October, 29, 2000. The European Patent Convention currently has 
38 contracting States, plus two so-called extension States (Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro), available at: 
<www.epo.org/about-us/epo/member-states.html> (accessed May 7, 2015). 
15 Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the legal protection of 
biotechnological inventions, Official Journal L 213, 30/07/1998. 
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further effect the areas of GMOs and Synthetic Biology. How these results fit into the wider context 
of the ongoing European controversies over the patentability and commercialization of the 
aforementioned technological areas will be discussed in section 5. This will finally allow us to 
complete the paper with some concluding remarks in section 6.  
 
1. The European Legal Framework 
 
The European Patent Office (EPO)16 is a supranational European organization that offers a 
centralized procedure for patent prosecution covering the signatory countries in accordance with the 
European Patent Convention (EPC). Once granted, a European patent is not a unitarian right. Rather 
it has in each of the contracting states for which it was granted, the same effects and is subject to the 
same conditions as a national patent granted by national patent offices.17 The EBA is the highest 
instance of the European Patent Office, and its decisions are final and cannot be challenged before 
another judiciary.18 The EBA decides on points of law referred to it by the Technical Boards of 
Appeal (TBA), gives opinions on points of law referred to it by the President of the EPO and also 
decides on petitions for review of decisions by the Boards of Appeal at the request of interested 
parties.19 However, it should be noted that national courts (and/or the future European Unified 
patent court) retain exclusive jurisdiction concerning validity and infringement after a European 
patent has been granted - except during the 9-month opposition period, which can only relate to 
validity. National courts are not bound by the EPO Boards of Appeal decisions, but will take these 
into consideration and will tend to find the arguments of the EPO boards persuasive. Likewise the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), which has competences to harmonise the uniform 
interpretation of EU legislation,20 is not bound by the EBA jurisprudence.  
On its turn, the Boards of Appeal may take into consideration decisions of national patent 
offices, national courts and the jurisprudence of the CJEU, but formally are not required to do so.21 
In fact, strictly speaking and in formal terms, the Boards of appeal of the EPO, are only bound to 
ensuring compliance with the norms of the EPC treaty understood as an independent and 
autonomous legal system for the grant of patents in Europe.22  
The European Patent Convention contains three statutory exceptions to patentability 
contained in Article 53 EPC. Such subject-matter is considered to fulfil all patentability criteria, but 
is nevertheless excluded due to diverse public policy reasons. The “Broccoli” and “Tomato” cases 
concern the interpretation of the exception from patentability prescribed in Article 53 (b) EPC, 
which provides that European patents shall not be granted in respect of:   
 
“plant or animal varieties or essentially biological processes for the production of plants or 
animals; this provision shall not apply to microbiological processes or the products thereof”. 
 
                                                     
16 Art. 4 (1) EPC 
17 Art 4(3); Art 2(2); EPC and Art. 63 EPC. 
18 Art 112 (2) EPC. However, it should be noted that national courts (and/or the future European Unified Patents courts) 
have exclusive jurisdition concerning validity and infringement after a European patent has been granted (except during 
the 9-month opposition period, which can only relate to validity). National courts are not bound by the EPO Boards of 
Appeal decisions. However, national courts will tend to find the arguments of the EPO boards persuasive. 
19 Art. 22 and Art. 112 (a) EPC. 
20 Art. 19 Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union 2012/C 326/01 Official Journal C 326 , 26/10/2012 P. 1 – 390  
21 G 5/83 OJ EPO 1985, 64; T 154/04 OJ EPO 2008, 46. 
22 Art. 23 (3) EPC 
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The subject is further addressed in Rules 26 and 27 of the Implementing Regulations, which 
were adopted by decision of the Administrative Council23 in order to implement the EU Biotech 
Directive. The Implementing Regulations are by statute considered as being integral parts of the 
EPC.24 Rule 26 defines ‘plant variety’; ‘essential biological process’ and ‘microbiological process’, 
as follows: 
 
(1) – (3) […] 
(4) "Plant variety" means any plant grouping within a single botanical taxon of the lowest known 
rank, which grouping, irrespective of whether the conditions for the grant of a plant variety right 
are fully met, can be:  
(a) defined by the expression of the characteristics that results from a given genotype or 
combination of genotypes, 
(b) distinguished from any other plant grouping by the expression of at least one of the said 
characteristics, and  
(c) considered as a unit with regard to its suitability for being propagated unchanged.  
(5) A process for the production of plants or animals is essentially biological if it consists entirely of 
natural phenomena such as crossing or selection.  
(6) "Microbiological process" means any process involving or performed upon or resulting in 
microbiological material.” 
 
At the EU level, the above mentioned Biotech Directive had been enacted in order to 
harmonize national legislation concerning the patentability of biotechnological inventions. In its 
Article 4 the Biotech Directive, which had to be implemented by the EU member states into their 
national legislations, establishes that plants varieties shall not be patentable, further elaborating that 
‘Inventions which concern plants [...] shall be patentable if the technical feasibility of the invention 
is not confined to a particular plant [...] variety.  
Essentially biological processes for the production of plants also shall not be patentable, 
‘[…]without prejudice to the patentability of inventions which concern a microbiological or other 
technical process or a product obtained by means of such a process.”25 Article 2 of the Biotech 
Directive defines 'biological material' as “any material containing genetic information and capable 
of reproducing itself or being reproduced in a biological system”;26 while 'microbiological process'’ 
is defined as “any process involving or performed upon or resulting in microbiological material”.27 
A process is essential biological ”if it consists entirely of natural phenomena such as crossing 
or selection”,28 and 'plant variety' is defined by reference to Article 5 of the Plant Variety Rights 
Regulation29 where it is described as a “plant grouping within a single botanical taxon of the lowest 
known rank”30 
All member states of the European Union (EU) are also signatory parties to the EPC. The 
EPC, however, is an international treaty and the EPO an European international organization but not 
an EU institution. Despite the lack of institutional link and formal obligation to do so, the 
provisions of the Biotechnology Directive have been taken into consideration by the EPO in the 
                                                     
23 Decision of the Administrative Council of 16.06.1999, which entered into force on 01.09.1999 (OJ 1999, 437). 
Regarding the functions and competences of the Administrative Council cf. Art. 33 (1) (b) EPC. 
24 Art 164 (1) EPC. 
25 Art 4 Biotech Directive. 
26 Art. 2 (1) (a) Biotech Directive  
27 Art. 2 (1) (b) Biotech Directive 
28 Art. 2 (2) Biotech Directive 
29 Art 2 (3) Biotech  
30 Art. 5 Council Regulation (EC) No 2100/94 of 27 July 1994 on Community plant variety rights (Plant variety rights 
regulation). 
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formulation of the current Implementing Regulations,31 which guide the application of Article 53 
(b) EPC, namely by mirroring its content in Rules 26 and 27 (b) and (c) and establishing its 
relevance as a supplementary means of interpretation.32 This explains also why the EBA refers to 
the provisions of the Biotech Directive in its decision.33  
As a matter of institutional background, it should further be mentioned that the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU), who has the final word in interpreting the stipulations of the 
Biotech Directive, has not been called upon to pronounce itself over the interpretation of article 2 
and 4 of the Biotech Directive. However, should such occasion arise, the jurisprudence set at the 
EPO Boards of Appeal would not bind the CJEU by precedent, nor in anyway limit the EU courts 
margin of appreciation. In fact, considering a previous decision on exceptions to patentability it is 
likely that divergence with the EBA may occur.34  
Finally, it should be noted that only EU members-states national courts and tribunals may 
submit referrals to the CJEU, e.g. under the so-called preliminary ruling procedure in Article 267 
TFEU35. The EPO Boards of Appeal, however, are not formally bound to comply with EU law and 
jurisprudence, nor does it have an institutional framework that would allow submitting matters of 
interpretation of the Biotech Directive to the CJEU’s appreciation.36 However, despite the 
formalities imposed by this institutional framework, as a matter of policy, the EPO has shown 
willingness to include the CJEU jurisprudence in its examination practice.37 
Against this background, the following section will now first describe the procedural history 
of the Broccoli” and “Tomato” cases, before we will turn to the decision and its impact. 
 
2. Procedural history 
 
The debate concerning the interpretation of Article 53 (b) EPC in regards to the patentability 
of plants and plant related inventions has evolved mostly around the concepts of plant variety and 
essentially biological processes for the production of plants; it has been the subject of several 
decisions and two consolidated referrals to the EBA. 
 
 
                                                     
31 Implementing Regulations to the Convention on the Grant of European Patents of 5 October 1973 as adopted by 
decision of the Administrative Council of the European Patent Organisation of 7 December 2006 and as last amended 
by decision of the Administrative Council of the European Patent Organisation of 15 October 2014 (Implementing 
Regulations) 
32 Rule 26 (1) Implementing Regulations. 
33 G 2/12, Reasons at VII, point 4 
34 C-34/10, Oliver Brüstle v Greenpeace eV, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 18 October 2011 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:402. See Timo Minssen and Ana Nordberg,  The Evolution of the CJEU's Case Law on Stem Cell 
Patents: Context, Outcome and Implications of Case C‑364/13 International Stem Cell Corporation. (March 11, 2015). 
Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2576807> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2576807> . 
35 Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Official Journal C 326 , 
26/10/2012 P. 0001 – 0390. 
36 See T 276/99 OJ EPO and G 2/06 OJ EPO 2006, 306. In T 276/99 the Boards noted that, prima facie, as the EPO 
boards of appeal were not a court or tribunal of an EU Member State, they did not have the status to refer a question to 
the CJEU. In G 2/06 the appellant had sought a referral of questions to the ECJ on the argument that since the 
implementing regulations repeat the wording of the Directive, in such case the EBA is interpreting European Union law 
and should refer the question of interpretation to the ECJ. The request for a preliminary ruling by the ECJEU was 
rejected as inadmissible under the argument that neither the EPC nor the Implementing Regulations contain any 
provision allowing for a referral of questions of law to the CJEU.  
37 After the Brüstle decision the EPO amended its guidelines for examination in conformity with the CJEU decision of 
the patentability of hESC’s. See Minssen and Nordberg, supra n. 34 (2015).  
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2.1 Consolidated cases Broccoli I & Tomato I  
The case originates in two patents granted by the EPO on 26 November 2003. Patent 
EP1211926 (the ‘Tomato patent’) granted to the Ministry of Agriculture of Israel was opposed by 
Unilever N.V.. While patent EP1069819 (the ‘Broccoli patent’) was granted to Plant Bioscience and 
opposed by Syngenta Participations AG and Groupe Limagrain Holding, two agricultural biotech 
companies. The decisions of the respective Technical Boards of Appeal (TBA) were object to 
referral to the EBA. The procedures were consolidated resulting in decisions G 2/07 (‘Broccoli I’) 
and G 1/08 (‘Tomato I)’.38  
In cases ‘Broccoli I’ & ‘Tomato I’ the EBA was confronted with two processes for producing 
plants using conventional breeding techniques, i.e. techniques which could not be regarded as 
genetic engineering.39 In the ‘Broccoli patent’ the invented process consisted of a non-
microbiological process for the production of plants, containing the steps of crossing and selecting 
plants, plus an additional feature of a technical nature consisting of checking for molecular markers 
in the broccoli produced in order to guide the crossing and selecting process. While the ’Tomato 
patent’ concerned a method for breeding tomato plants that produce tomatoes with reduced fruit 
water content comprising mainly steps of conventional breeding techniques of selection and 
crossing, plus the additional steps of allowing the tomatoes to remain on the vine past the point of 
normal ripening, and visual screening for reduced fruit water content as indicated by extended 
preservation of the ripe fruit and wrinkling of the fruit skin.40 
The consolidated decision of the EBA attempts to determine the meaning of “essentially 
biological” in the context of “essentially biological processes for the production of plants” within 
Article 53 EPC and Rule 26(5) EPC. 
On May 22, 2007, in the opposition proceedings concerning the ‘Broccoli I’ case, the 
Technical Board of Appeal 3.3.04 referred the following questions to the EBA: 
 
"1. Does a non-microbiological process for the production of plants which contains the steps of 
crossing and selecting plants escape the exclusion of Article 53(b) EPC merely because it contains, 
as a further step or as part of any of the steps of crossing and selection, an additional feature of a 
technical nature? 
2. If question 1 is answered in the negative, what are the relevant criteria for distinguishing non-
microbiological plant production processes excluded from patent protection under Article 53(b) 
EPC from non-excluded ones? In particular, is it relevant where the essence of the claimed 
invention lies and/or whether the additional feature of a technical nature contributes something to 
the claimed invention beyond a trivial level?"41 
 
Almost a year later, in opposition proceedings concerning the ‘Tomato I’ case, the same 
Technical Board of Appeal, by interlocutory decision T 1242/06 dated 4 April 2008, referred 
another set of identical questions to the EBA, adding the following: 
 
"1. Does a non-microbiological process for the production of plants consisting of steps of crossing 
and selecting plants fall under the exclusion of Article 53(b) EPC only if these steps reflect and 
correspond to phenomena which could occur in nature without human intervention? 
2. If question 1 is answered in the negative, […] [text identical to Q.1 in ‘Broccoli I’]  
3. If question 2 is answered in the negative, […] " 42 [text identical to Q.2 in ‘Broccoli I’] 
 
                                                     
38 G 2/07 Broccoli/Plant Bioscience OJ EPO 2012, 130 and G 1/08 Tomatoes/State of Israel OJ EPO 2012, 130, 206 
39 G 2/07, Summary of facts and submissions at, I  point 2. 
40 G 1/08, Summary of facts and submissions at II point 2. 
41 Interlocutory decision T 83/05, dated 22 May 2007. 
42 Interlocutory decision T 1242/06, dated 4 April 2008 
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By decision of 21 April 2008 the EBA decided to consider the points of law referred by the 
TBA 3.3.04 in case T 83/05 (G 2/07 ‘Broccoli I’) and in case T 1242/06 (G 1/08 ‘Tomato I’) in 
consolidated proceedings.43  
The questions at issue had also been the object of previous decisions by the EPO TBA’s. 
Namely in T 320/8744 where the TBA toke the view that whether or not a (non- microbiological) 
process is to be considered as "essentially biological" had to be decided on the basis of the essence 
of the invention taking into account the totality of human intervention and its impact on the result 
achieved, and that the need for human intervention alone is not sufficient criterion for not being 
considered "essentially biological".45 While later on T 356/93, the TBA examined the concept of 
microbiological processes and found that a process for the production of plants comprising an 
essential technical step, which has a decisive impact on the desired final result, does not fall under 
the exception to patentability under Article 53 (b) EPC.46 
In this first set of referrals the EBA elaborated on the non-patentable concept of ‘essentially 
biological process’ identifying it with “A non-microbiological process for the production of plants 
which contains or consists of the steps of sexually crossing the whole genomes of plants and of 
subsequently selecting plant”.47 Further adding, in accordance with T 320/8748 that not just any kind 
of human intervention can suffice to elude the application of Article 53 (b) EPC. Stating that the 
patentability exception cannot be circumvented, merely by adding ”a step of a technical nature 
which serves to enable or assist the performance of the steps of sexually crossing the whole 
genomes of plants or of subsequently selecting plants.”49 According to the EBA, a crossing and 
selecting process can be patentable if it contains an additional step of technical nature which by 
itself introduces or modifies a trait in the plant genome. This technical step must be so “that the 
introduction or modification of that trait is not the result of the mixing of the genes of the plants 
chosen for sexual crossing”.50 Concerning the valid criteria for determining whether a process is, or 
not, excluded from patentability as being “essentially biological”, the EBA clarified that it is 
irrelevant “whether a step of a technical nature is a new or known measure, whether it is trivial or a 
fundamental alteration of a known process, whether it does or could occur in nature or whether the 
essence of the invention lies in it.”51 Here the EBA diverged from the approach followed in T 
320/87, and considered that any approach that relies on criteria determined by reference to the state 
of art is flawed, because it confuses considerations relevant for patentability with those relevant for 
assessing the patentability requirements, namely, novelty and inventive step.52 
While considering the interpretation of Rule 26(5) EPC, the EBA found that a literal reading 
of the rule resulted ambiguous, if not contradictory.53 The reasoning was that Rule 26 (5) states on 
the one hand that only processes which consist entirely of natural phenomena are considered to be 
essentially biological processes for the production of plants, while on the other hand also states that 
crossing and selection are given as examples of natural phenomena, and yet the systematic crossing 
and selection carried out in plant breeding are not natural phenomena (in the sense of spontaneously 
                                                     
43 G 2/07 Broccoli/Plant Bioscience OJ EPO 2012, 130 and G 1/08 Tomatoes/State of Israel OJ EPO 2012, 130, 206. 
44 T 320/87 Hybrid plants/Lubrizol  OJ EPO 1990, 112. 
45 T 320/87, Reasons at point 6. 
46 T 356/93 Plant cells/Plant Genetic Systems OJ EPO, 1995, 545, Reasons at point 40.1. 
47 Consolidated cases G 2/07 and G 1/08, Order answer to question 1 
48 T 320/87 Hybrid plants/Lubrizol  OJ EPO 1990, 112 
49 Consolidated cases G 2/07 and G 1/08, Order answer to question 2 
50 Consolidated cases G 2/07 and G 1/08, Order answer to question 3 
51 Consolidated cases G 2/07 and G 1/08, Order answer to  question 4. 
52 Consolidated cases G 2/07 and G 1/08, Reasons at point 6.4.1. 
53 Consolidated cases G 2/07 and G 1/08, Reasons at point 4.5. 
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occurring in nature) but measures implemented by means of human intervention.54 For this reason 
the EBA examined the text of the Biotech Directive, and its legal history searching for clarification, 
concluding that this interpretative element did not provided the needed answers.55 It also found that, 
since Rule 26(5) did not provide any useful guidance on the subject, the term “essentially biological 
process for the production of plants” should be interpreted on its own authority and that this was a 
task within the scope of the EBA jurisdictional authority.56 The EBA turned then to the preparatory 
works of the EPC, concluding that the legislator intended to exclude from patentability the types of 
plant breeding processes which were at that time the conventional methods for the breeding of plant 
varieties, including those based on the sexual crossing of plants (i.e. of their whole genomes) and on 
the subsequent selection of the plants having the desired trait(s).57 It also concluded that the choice 
of the word “essentially” was deliberate, reflecting a legislative intent to prevent the circumvention 
of the exception by mere use of a technical device in the breading process.58 This justifying the 
answer provided, whereas the presence in a claim of one feature which could be characterised as 
biological does not necessarily result in the claimed process as a whole being excluded from 
patentability under Article 53(b) EPC, except where the process includes sexual crossing and 
selection. This meant that, in practice following this decision it has become nearly impossible to 
obtain patents concerning process claims containing crossing and/or selection steps, even where 
such are subsequent steps to a process initiated as ‘non-biological’, still the process may be 
considered essentially biological. Consequently, product claims have come to be seen by 
prospective patentees as a better option.  
 
2.2 The ‘Broccoli II’ & ‘Tomato II’ referrals  
 After the issuance of ‘Broccoli I’ & ‘Tomato I’, both Patentees reacted by deleting the process 
claims. The remaining claims, in both patents relate to product and product and product-by-process 
claims. These amendments led to the second referrals, known as the consolidated cases G 2/12 
‘Tomato II’ and G 2/13 ‘Broccoli II’, and concern the question of determining whether the 
patentability exception in Article 53 (b) EPC extends or not to products of non-patentable methods. 
Such issues had not been addressed in the previous ‘Broccoli I’ & ‘Tomato I’ referrals and were 
thus left unsolved. 
 In the ‘Tomato II’ case the opponent reacted to the amended claims arguing that allowing 
claims to plants obtained by an essentially biological process would undermine the rationale 
supporting the EBA decision in ‘Broccoli I’ & ‘Tomato I’ and that it should not be acceptable to 
circumvent the patentability exception merely by changing claim format. The TBA justified the 
referral in ‘Tomato II’ by the fact that the patentee had restricted the claims to mere product claims 
that were not considered in the first referral. The claims were directed to dehydrated tomato fruits, 
and as such not considered a plant variety, but rather plant parts capable of producing entire 
plants.59 However, the TBA questioned itself whether patenting such subject-matter would not 
render the patent exception completely ineffective, and thus defeating the legislative purpose.60 The 
TBA also considered that such legal construction would allow patentees to indirectly obtain patent 
protection over excluded methods as the product claims would involve “a broad protection which 
                                                     
54 ibid 
55 Consolidated cases G 2/07 and G 1/08, Reasons at point 4.8.3 
56 Consolidated cases G 2/07 and G 1/08, Reasons at point 5. 
57 Consolidated cases G 2/07 and G 1/08, Reasons at point 6.4.2.3 
58 ibid 
59 Interlocutory decision T 1242/06 dated 31 May 2012 OJ EPO 2013, 42, Reasons at points 33 to 39. 
60 Interlocutory decision T 1242/06 dated 31 May 2012 OJ EPO 2013, 42, Reasons at point 40. 
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encompasses that which would have been provided by an excluded process claim.”61 Having this in 
consideration and also the general interest of the questions for other pending applications, the TBA 
considered that a decision of the EBA was necessary and by interlocutory decision T 1242/06 dated 
May 31, 201262 the TBA referred the following questions to the EBA:  
 
“1. Can the exclusion of essentially biological processes for the production of plants in Article 53 
(b) EPC have a negative effect on the allowability of a product claim directed to plants or plants 
material such as fruit? 
2.   In particular, is a claim directed to plants or plant material other than a plant variety allowable 
even if the only method available at the filling date for generating the claimed subject-matter is 
an essentially biological process for the production of plants disclosed in the patent application? 
3.  Is it of relevance in the context of questions 1 and 2 that the protection conferred by the product 
claim encompasses the generation of the claimed product by means of an essentially biological 
process for the production of plants excluded as such under Article 53 (b) EPC?” 
 
Around a year later, by interlocutory decision T 83/05 dated July 8, 201363 the TBA issued a 
second referral to the EBA (the ‘Broccoli II’ case). Questions 1, 2 (b) and 3 are identical to the 
‘Tomato II’ referral. Questions 2 (a) and 4 consisting of further specifications of questions 2 and 3, 
read as follows: 
 
“2. In particular 
(a) Is a product-by-process claim directed to plants or plant material other than a plant variety 
allowable if its process features define an essentially biological process for the production of plants?” 
[…] 
4. If a claim directed to plants or plants material other than a plant variety is considered not allowable 
because the plant product claim encompasses the generation of the claimed product by means of a 
process excluded from patentability under Article 53 (b) EPC, is it possible to waive the protection for 
such generation by "disclaiming" the excluded process?” 
 
Concerning the reasons justifying the referral, the TBA refers to the respective reason of the 
‘Tomato II’ case considering these to be essential to the appeal in case T 83/05. It also explained the 
option to refer modified questions (questions 2(a) and 4). Instead of simply stay the proceedings 
pending the answers of the referral in case G 2/12 ‘Tomato II’,64 the TBA considered that referring 
modified questions would allow for an answer encompassing the merits of the questions of law 
relevant to both cases.65 The ‘Broccoli II’ case, although similar, differs in relation to the ‘Tomato 
II’ case insofar as the claims in the first are directed to plants and plants parts, whereas the ‘Tomato 
II’ product claims refer to fruits. Furthermore, the ‘Broccoli’ claims are constructed in the form of 
product-by-process claims, whereas the first auxiliary request contains an attempt to disclaim the 
excluded process. In the view of the TBA, these material divergences justified the need to 
specifically refer such issues to the EBA.66 
2.3 Main arguments and 2nd case consolidation 
Once again the EBA consolidated the two referrals in a single procedure and invited 
comments from the patent proprietors, from the opponents of the Broccoli case and from the 
                                                     
61 Interlocutory decision T 1242/06 dated 31 May 2012 OJ EPO 2013, 42, Reasons at point 37. 
62 Interlocutory decision T 1242/06 dated 31 May 2012 OJ EPO 2013, 42, Order. 
63 Interlocutory decision T 83/05 dated 8 July 2013 OJEPO 2014, A39. 
64 Interlocutory decision T 83/05 dated 8 July 2013 OJEPO 2014, A39, Reasons at points  13 to 20. 
65 Interlocutory decision T 83/05 dated 8 July 2013 OJEPO 2014, A39, Reasons at points 21 to 22 
66 Id. 
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President of the EPO. The case raised considerable public interest and a considerable number of 
amici curia briefs were submitted.  
 The State of Israel, proprietor of the ‘Tomato’ patent, argued that the referral should be 
deemed inadmissible because the criteria of Article 112 (1) (a) EPC were not fulfilled67, arguing 
that the EBA in G 1/98 ‘Transgenic Plant II’68 already had concluded that only product claims 
directed to plant varieties are excluded from patentability under Article 53 (b) EPC.69 Further 
adding that if the referral was to be considered admissible then decisions G 2/07 ‘Broccoli I’ and G 
1/08 ‘Tomato I’ should be reviewed in order to exclude only those processes which result directly in 
a plant variety.70 The State of Israel argued that rules of interpretation imply a narrow interpretation, 
and concluded that accordingly the first and third referred questions should be answered in the 
negative and the second in the affirmative.71 
 The proprietor of the ‘Broccoli’ patent - Plant Bioscience Limited - stated that the first 
question of the referral should be answered in the negative and therefor the remaining questions did 
not required an answer. Alternatively, the subsequent questions should be answered in favour of the 
allowability of a product claim or product-by-process claim as defined in the referral (second and 
third questions) or in favour of the allowability of "disclaiming" the process steps in the product 
claim that infringed the process exclusion in Article 53 (b) EPC (fourth question).72 In similarity to 
the ‘Tomato’ patent owner, it was further argued that G 2/07 ‘Broccoli I’ and G 1/08 ‘Tomato I’ 
should be reviewed since the decisions originated a further referral. Plant Bioscience also sustained 
that exclusions should be constructed narrowly and that the exclusion should not be interpreted as 
extending to product claims which in the patentee’s opinion are clearly distinguished from process 
claims in Article 53(b) EPC.73 
 The ’Tomato’ patent opponent – Unilever - withdrew its appeal by its letter dated 28 June 
2012 and in did not filed any submissions during the proceedings before the EBA, nor attended the 
oral proceedings.74 On their turn, the two ‘Broccoli’ opponents submitted that questions 1, 3 and 4 
should be answered in the negative, while question 2 should be in principle answered in the 
affirmative.75 Syngenta Participations AG argued that the EBA decisions G 2/07 ’Broccoli I’ and G 
1/08 ’Tomato I’ had already expanded the scope of the process exclusion to processes which as a 
whole have a technical character, this conclusion, being in conflict with Rule 27(b) EPC and the 
ordinary meaning of the term "essentially biological processes for the production of plants". Further 
adding that to exclude plants which are obtainable by an essentially biological process would result 
in nothing being patentable in the plant area.76 Groupe Limagrain Holding, the second opponent to 
the ’Broccoli patent’, argued in favour of the allowability of a plant product claim independent of 
the process implemented for making that product, even if the process was an essentially biological 
                                                     
67 Article 112 (1) (a) reads as follows: 1. “In order to ensure uniform application of the law, or if a point of law of 
fundamental importance arises: (a) the Board of Appeal shall, during proceedings on a case and either of its own 
motion or following a request from a party to the appeal, refer any question to the Enlarged Board of Appeal if it 
considers that a decision is required for the above purposes. If the Board of Appeal rejects the request, it shall give the 
reasons in its final decision;” 
68 G 1/98 ‘Transgenic Plant/Novartis’ OJ EPO 2000, 111, available at: 
<http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/4831A04A31133EA6C12572C8006DFE59/$File/g980001.pdf
> (accessed 10 May 2015) 
69 Consolidated cases G 2/12 and G 2/13: G2/13, Submissions of the parties at V point 1.1 . 
70Id., at  V point1.2. 
71Id., atV points1.3 to 1.5. 
72 Id,, at  V point 2.1. 
73 Id., at V points 2.2 to 2.7 
74 Id., at V point 3. 
75 Id., at V point 4.1 (a) and.4.2 (a). 
76 Id. , at V points 4.1 (d) and (e) 
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process. Accordingly the issue of disclaimers would not be necessary.77 It further suggested that the 
claim should not confer protection on the use of the patented product to generate new, different 
plants which were outside the scope of the patent. In order to ensure this, measures should be 
implemented, for example in the form of a breeder's exemption in national law, or a waiver of 
protection in the form of a statement in the patent specification.78 
 The President of the EPO concluded that Article 53(b) EPC did not have a negative effect on 
the allowability of product claims to plants., also commenting that there is no indication, neither in 
the wording, nor preparatory works, supporting that the exclusion of essentially biological processes 
should be extended to products, further stating that any extension of an exclusion from patentability 
in this respect would be a matter for the legislator to decide.79 
 As mentioned these cases attracted a lot of attention in the patent community and society in 
general and, as a result, a considerable number of amici curiae briefs were submitted. These were 
filed by professional representatives, patent attorneys' associations, interest groups, farmers' 
associations, plant breeders, plant breeders' associations, seed producing associations and firms, 
scientists, politicians, and even private persons.80 The contributes offered a wide range of opinions 
that can be grouped in three lines of reasoning: (1) several submissions concluded that the non-
patentability of "essentially biological processes for the production of plants" did not imply a 
negative impact on the patentability of plants, plant material such as fruits, or plant parts;81 (2) 
Others argued that claims directed at products derived from essentially biological processes were 
excluded from patenting under Article 53(b) EPC, as it was understood by the decisions of the 
Enlarged Board in cases G 2/07 ‘Broccoli I’ and G 1/08 ‘Tomato I’ as well as Article 4 Biotech 
Directive. Such views were grounded on arguments similar to those submitted by the parties to the 
proceedings and the EPO President, but also on scientific and economic aspects;82 (3) the last group 
of amici curiae briefs expressed a number of general objections against patenting this type of 
technologies. Their objections were essentially based upon ethical, economic and social concerns 
related to the patenting of plants (and animals) in general and in particular of plants produced by 
conventional plant breeding methods.83 
                                                     
77 Id., at V point 4.2 (d) 
78 Id., para V.4.2 (e). 
79 Id., the President of the EPO submissions VI, point 1.1 to point 1.7 and ppoints VI.2.1 and VI.2.2. 
80 Id., the amici curiae submissions at  VII point1. 
81Id. , the amici curiae submissions at VII point2. See for example The Charted Institute of Patent Attorneys (CIPA), 
Amicus Curiae brief in G 2/12, received December4, 2012 stating that “the patentability of a product is in principle 
independent of the process by which is made”; also in International Federation of Intellectual Property Attorneys 
(FICPI), Amicus Curiae brief in G 2/12, November 28,2012, the FICPI offers a similar understanding and argues for a 
narrow interpretation of the exception; while in Union of European Practitioners in Intellectual Property, Amicus Curiae 
brief in G 2/13, November 28, 2013, at para 57-60, it is added that extension of the exception to products is not 
justified, and that Plant breeders right do not provided for adequate protection due to the existence of a breeders 
exemption, which allows breeders to use the patent variety for the production of new plant varieties, as long as these 
new plant varieties are not essentially derived from the protected variety; on its turn and in similarity in the International 
Association for the Protection of Intellectual Property (AIPPI), Amicus Curiae brief in G 2/13, November 29, 2013, the 
AIPPI argues that Questions 1 and 3 should be answered in the negative, Questions 2a and 2b in the affirmative, while 
question 4 would not require an answer. It is stated that the patentability of a product is independent of the patentability 
of the process by which it is made and that “this is settled law and should not be disturbed”. To decide otherwise, in the 
AIPPI opinion, would imply to override many established patent law principles.  
82 Id., the amici curiae submissions at  VII points.3 and 4. An example would be the submission of the European Seed 
Association, which argued the necessity to extend the patentability exclusion to products, in order to avoid the 
exception to become meaningless. See European Seed Association, Amicus Curiae brief in G 2/13, September 26, 2014. 
83 Id., the amici curiae submissions at VII point 5 See for all European Parliament Amicus Curiae brief in G 2/12, 
November 28, 2012, consisting of a Motion for a resolution on the patenting of essential biological processes 
(2012/2623 (RSP)), at point 4, in which the EU parliament “calls on the EPO also to exclude from patenting products 
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3. The Decision(s) 
 
First of all, the EBA rejected the State of Israel arguments for inadmissibility of the ‘Tomato 
II’ referral, appeals, concluding that in both cases an answer to at least some of the referred 
questions was necessary. The Board found that G 1/98 ‘Transgenic Plant’ had not commented on 
the extension of the exclusion to essentially biological processes to products and that G 1/98 
‘Transgenic Plant’ only concerned the plant variety exclusion. It also stated that these referred 
questions have relevance beyond the cases in which they had arisen. In the view of the EBA their 
importance extends to similar cases and would therefore serve the uniform application of the law.84 
Consequently, both referrals were deemed admissible.85 
Having observed that the referring questions do not relate to the plant variety exclusion or to 
the patentability of essentially biological processes, the Board held next that there was no need for a 
further review of either G 1/98 ‘Transgenic Plant II’, G 2/07 ‘Broccoli I’or G 1/08 ‘Tomato I’.86 
Subsequently, the board turned to an examination of the interpretative meaning of the 
exclusions codified in Article 53(b) EPC in order to determine whether a narrow or a broad 
interpretation should be given to the language. First, the EBA noticed that  
 
“there is no general notion of an obligatorily restrictive construction of exceptions to patentability, for 
example, such as that adopted by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) when insisting on a 
narrow interpretation of exceptions to or derogations from fundamental EC Treaty principles embodied in 
the four freedoms.”87 
 
However, then the EBA went on in stating that “such a narrow interpretation might well 
result from applying the general principles of interpretation to a specific provision with regard to 
specific legal and factual circumstances.”88 After a more comprehensive examination and 
application of the traditional methods and rules of legal interpretation considering grammatical, 
systematic, teleological, and historical interpretative methods as well as subsequent agreements and 
practice89, the EBA decided indeed to interpret the Article 53 (b) EPC narrowly.  
This narrow interpretation was mainly based on legal-systematic considerations and was held 
to be derivable from (1) the systematic and contextual positioning of Article 53 (b) EPC among 
exceptions to patentability within Chapter I of Part II of the EPC, and by (2) the identification of an 
analogy to rule 27 (b) EPC, which provides that biotechnological inventions relating to plants are 
patentable if the technical feasibility of the invention is not confined to a particular plant variety.90  
The usefulness of a teleological interpretation under the “ratio of legis”, was rejected by the 
EBA91 based on the observations made by the EBA in G 2/07  ‘Broccoli I’ and G 1/08 ‘Tomato I’, 
where it was stated:  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
derived from conventional breeding methods and all conventional breeding methods, including SMART breeding 
(precision breeding) and breeding material used for conventional breeding”. 
84Id., Reasons at I. para 5. 
85 Id., Reasons at I. para 2-8. 
86 Id. Reasons at III. 
87 Id. Reasons VI (2) (citing the ECJ (now CJEU) judgment of 21 June 1974 in C 2-74, Jean Reyners v. Belgian State, 
ECJ 1974, 631).. 
88 Id.  
89 Id. 
90 Id. Reasons at VII, point 2. 
91 Id. Reasons at VII, point 3. 
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“However, since the respective legislative purposes behind the sub-items in Article 53 EPC and even 
those behind the alternatives of Article 53(b) EPC are quite different, the systematic context of the 
exclusion of essentially biological processes from patentability, namely its place in Article 53(b) EPC, 
does not as such indicate what the purpose of the provision is”.92 
 
The EBA found this conclusion still to be valid and accordingly held the object and purpose 
of the exclusion under Article 53(b) EPC not to be sufficiently obvious to answer the question 
whether or not the clause is to be construed in a narrow or broad way. Subsequent agreement or 
practice, and historical interpretation, both internationally acknowledged as methods of  
interpreting provisions of treaties, such as the EPC, and codified in by Articles 31 and 32 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties93, were also not regarded as being feasible in 
interpreting the scope of the exclusion.94  
In following the above described systematic approach, the Enlarged Board could not find any 
sufficient indication or evidence in the EPC that the exclusion of “essentially biological processes 
for the production of plants” in Article 53(b) EPC is to be interpreted broadly such that it extends 
beyond the excluded processes to products defined or obtained by such processes.95 
Although not addressed by the parties, the Board then considered an issue that was raised in 
the various amicus curiae briefs. That is whether the fundamental legal impact of this understanding 
of Article 53(b) EPC requires secondary considerations96 and the application of dynamic 
interpretations, to broaden of the scope of the process exclusion if, for example, the interpretation 
would be at odds with the legislator’s intention.97 Yet, the EBA did not consider this to be the case. 
It pointed out that the concept of dynamic interpretation does not require revising the result of the 
interpretation established by applying traditional rules of construction and that an extension of the 
restriction was thus not necessary.98 In that regard, the EBA observed that extending the exclusion 
to cover plants or plant materials would result in inconsistency within the EPC, since such products 
are generally eligible for patent protection (other than plant varieties).99 The EBA also stressed in 
particular that the chosen narrow interpretation of the exclusion did not lead to an erosion of the 
exception, so that “the legislator's intentions could be frustrated by the choice of the claim category 
and by "skilful" claim drafting”, since the process was still excluded from patentability and the 
product claim still must satisfy the other criteria for patentability (such as novelty and inventive 
step).100  
Furthermore, and referring to its earlier decision in G 1/98 ‘Transgenic Plant II’, the EBA 
emphasized that the EPC unmistakably provides for a clear distinction between, on the one hand, 
the question and aspects of patentability of a claimed subject-matter (Articles 52 to 57, 76, 83, 84 
and 123 (EPC), and, on the other hand, the separate question of the scope of protection (Articles 64 
(2) and 69 EPC) that is conferred by the claim.101. In that regard, the Board noted that although 
product or product-by-process claims may encompass and provide protection for not only the 
product but for the use of a product and production of the product, the relevant point of law that was 
                                                     
92 G2/07 and G 1/08, supra, Reasons at point6.4.2.1. 
93 Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties of May 1969. 
94 Consolidated cases G 2/12 and G 2/13, Reasons at VII, point 4.-5. 
95 Id. Reasons at  VII,  point  6 (First intermediate conclusion). 
96 Id. at VIII. 
97 Id. at  VIII., point 1 
98 Id., VIII, point  2 (1)-(6). 
99 Id. VIII at point 2. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. Reasons at VIII point 2(6) (a) and in particular (b). 
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referred to the EBA in these cases is “whether subject matter is excluded from patentability, but not 
the scope of protection conferred by such a claim.”102  
The Board therefore concluded that the “essentially biological process” exclusion of Article 
53(b) EPC does not prevent the patentability of claims directed to plants or plant material, such as a 
fruit or plant parts, provided that they do not claim an individual plant variety. Thus in the case of G 
2/12 – ‘Tomato II’ - the Board answered the first and third referred questions in the negative and the 
third question in the affirmative, using a double negation. In summary, the EBA’s decision 
therefore gave the following answers to the questions of law referred to it in G 2/12 ‘Tomato II’: 
 
1.  The exclusion of essentially biological processes for the production of plants in Article 53(b) EPC 
does not have a negative effect on the allowability of a product claim directed to plants or plant 
material such as a fruit. 
2.  In particular, the fact that the only method available at the filing date for generating the claimed 
subject-matter is an essentially biological process for the production of plants disclosed in the 
patent application does not render a claim directed to plants or plant material other than a plant 
variety unallowable. 
3.  In the circumstances, it is of no relevance that the protection conferred by the product claim 
encompasses the generation of the claimed product by means of an essentially biological process 
for the production of plants excluded as such under Article 53(b) EPC.103 
 
In the case of G 2/13 – ‘Broccoli II’ the EBA’s answers were essentially the same, but, in 
addition, clarified that the above conclusions equally apply to product-by-process claims. Thus, the 
first and third questions were once more answered in the negative and the second question was once 
more answered in the affirmative, using a double negation. Moreover, the Board considered that the 
fourth question of law - asking whether the problem could be resolved by a disclaimer - was not 
applicable and hence did not require an answer.104 
 
 
4. Legal analysis & practical implications 
 
‘Tomato II’ and ‘Broccoli II’ have made unmistakably clear that Article 53(b) EPC does not 
preclude the grant of compound claims directed to plant or plant material resulting from an process 
excluded as such under the same provision. Hence, if an invention relates to an “essentially 
biological process for the production of plants or animals”, which is explicitly excluded as such 
under Article 53(b) EPC, the product resulting from such a process can still be patented, as long as 
the following criteria are met: 
 
 the claimed plant or plant material meets further basic patentability requirements such as novelty 
(Article 54 EPC), inventive step (Article 56 EPC) or industrial application (Article 57 EPC), 
 the application contains appropriate language to sufficiently define the claimed product, which 
may in certain situations be achieved by using product-by-process claim language, and 
 the patent does not claim a plant variety as such, which are also excluded by Article 53(b).  
 
In essence the decisions thus confirm that claims directed to novel and inventive plants obtained 
by methods which include breeding steps, as opposed to plant varieties, should in principle be 
allowable under the EPC, irrespective of whether claimed in a product per se or product-by-process 
format. Patent protection will only be categorically denied if the product is a “plant variety”. 
                                                     
102 Id. Reasons at VIII, point 2(6) (b). 
103 Id., operative part of the decision (Order of the Court). 
104 Id. operative part of the decision (Order of the Court). 
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However, only a claim to a single plant variety is excluded under Article 53 (b) EPC (first part of 
clause), which was not the case in either of the referred situations. In that regard it should be 
remembered that the EBA rejected the argument for a new review of decision G1/98 ‘Transgenic 
plant II’/105. Consequently the following finding by the EBA in G 1/98 still applies: “A claim 
wherein specific plant varieties are not individually claimed is not excluded from patentability 
under Article 53(b), EPC even though it may embrace plant varieties.”  
The ultimate significance of G 2/12 ‘Tomato II’ and G 2/13’Broccoli II’ is accordingly that 
the EPO will continue to grant patents on plant inventions as it did before the last ‘Tomato I’ 
referral in 2011. This decision was not entirely surprising, since the President of the EPO 
commented on the referrals leading to G 2/12 and G 2/13 and came to essentially the same 
conclusion. This outcome is of course very positive news for patent applicants engaged in GMO’s 
and innovative plant breeding. However, at least one stakeholder, the Berne Declaration and 
SWISSAID group, has stated that the decision favours giant agrochemical companies and will 
hinder innovation in the area of plant and animal selection from small plant breeders.106 The 
sensitive and very multifaceted discussion over the wider impact of these decisions, however, falls 
outside the scope of the paper and will only briefly addressed in our discussion and concluding 
remarks. 
An interesting additional aspect to the decision that should be carefully observed is that the 
outcome of the ‘Tomato II’ and ‘Brocolli II’ decisions stands in stark contrast to the national patent 
legislation of some major contracting states. In Germany or The Netherlands for example – two 
countries with a considerable industry conventionally active in the relevant fields - national patent 
legislation explicitly excludes products produced by essentially biological processes as well as the 
processes themselves. Accordingly the ‘Tomato II’ and ‘Broccoli II’ patents would not have been 
granted in these jurisdictions. This is also explicitly recognized in the EBA decision at VIII.2.6 (d) 
of the Reasons, where the EBA discusses national patentability exclusions of plants which are 
produced by an essentially biological process: 
 
Furthermore, the Enlarged Board takes note that those legislatures that are of the view that plant products 
obtained by essentially biological processes should not be patentable have chosen to amend their 
legislation in this respect, thereby deviating from the wording of Article 53 (b) EPC. Both in Germany 
and in the Netherlands legislation exists excluding product claims from patentability where the claimed 
products have been generated by an essentially biological process for the protection of plants (see § 2 a 
(1) No.1 German Patent Act of 1936, as last amended in 2013; Article 3 (1) (d) Dutch Patent Act of 1994, 
as last amended in 2014). No such amendments have  been made in, for example, the United Kingdom 
(see Section 76A and Schedule A2 (1) (b) and (3) (f) UK Patents Act of 1977, as last amended in 2014), 
France (see Art. L. 611-19 CPI, Loi no 2004-1338 of 8 December 2004, I. 3), Austria (see §2 (2) Austrian 
Patent Law of 1970, as last amended in 2014) and Switzerland (see Article 2 (2) Swiss Patent Law of 
1954, as last amended in 2012).107 
  
 This finding has two implications. First of all, the amendment of the German Patent Act of 
June 27, 2013, explicitly excluding product claims on plants and animals exclusively obtained by 
essentially biological processes in addition to the already excluded essentially biological processes, 
could indeed be interpreted has an indication that at least some legislators found that Article 53(b) 
EPC in its current wording does not unambiguously exclude products of essentially biological 
                                                     
105 Decision of the Enlarged Board of Appeal dated 20 December 1999 in G 1/98 Transgenic plant/NOVARTIS II , OJ 
EPO 2000, 111. 
106 See Catherine Saez, EPO Backs Patents On Conventional Plants: Broccoli, Tomato Cases Decided,  Intellectual 
Property Watch 01/04/2015, available at: <http://www.ip-watch.org/2015/04/01/epo-backs-patents-on-conventional-
plants-broccoli-tomato-cases-decided/> (accessed 14 May 2015). 
107 Consolidated cases G 2/12 and G 2/13, Reasons at VIII.2.6 (e). 
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processes.108 This would actually support the EPO’s narrow interpretation of Article 53 (b) EPC.109 
Alternatively it could be argued that these amendments of the German and Dutch Patent Act 
“indicate that at least the German and Dutch legislator interpret the Biotech Directive 
accordingly”.110 This in turn raises the question of how the CJEU would interpret the Biotech 
Directive with respect to the exclusion of essentially biological processes under Article 4(1)(b) of 
the Biotech Directive.111  
 Second, while the disparities between the EPC and national laws continue to render the 
European patent application procedures rather complicated, ‘Tomato II’ and ‘Broccoli II’ provide 
unambiguous signals encouraging applicants who intend to obtain a patent for such plants to 
prosecute their patent applications at the European Patent Office. This is certainly significant from a 
practical perspective. Yet, it still remains to be seen how such patents will succeed during the 
national litigation phase.  
This brings us to the emerging Unitary Patent system and another issue, which relates to the 
following statement made by the EBA in “Tomato II”: 
 
“As pointed out by the referring Boards, by virtue of Article 64(2) EPC:  (a)  the protection conferred by a 
process claim extends to the products directly obtained by such process,  (b)  the protection conferred by a 
product claim comprises using as well as producing the product and  (c) the product claimed in terms of a 
product-by-process claim extends to products which are structurally identical to the claimed product but 
which are produced by a different method.”112  
 
In particular point (c) in this statements indicates that the EBA interprets the scope of 
protection of a product-by-process claim in a very broad manner, which does not restrict the scope 
of protection of a product-by-process to merely products which are obtained by the process steps 
described in that claim. Some national civil courts in Europe which hear patent infringement cases, 
however, appear to have much narrower views on the scope of protection that is awarded to such 
claims.113 The question is then what this might mean with regard to the emerging unitary Patent 
System under the rules of the so-called European Patent Package.114 Some commentators have 
pointed out that: 
 
While the statement of the Enlarged Board is at best an obiter dictum and not binding for any national 
court, it might become relevant once the Unified Patent Court is operating in Europe. Namely, according 
to Article 24 (1) (c) of the Agreement on a Unified Patent Court, one source of law for procedures before 
that Court shall be the European Patent Convention. This source of law might well include the case law 
                                                     
108 Hanna Kompagne, EPO - A decision less green – but is it sweet yet?, EPLAW Patent Blog (13.04.2015), available 
at: http://www.eplawpatentblog.com/eplaw/2015/04/epo-a-decision-less-green-but-is-it-sweet-yet-.html (accessed 19 
May 2015). 
109 This seems also to have been realized by the EBA, see: Consolidated cases G 2/12 and G 2/13, Reasons at VIII.2.6. 
(d). 
110 Franz-Josef Zimmer and Markus Grammel, Plants Patents in Europe, available at: 
http://www.grunecker.de/files/fz+hr._grammel_publikation_plant_patents_in_europe.pdf  (accessed 30 July 2015). 
111 Id. 
112 Id,  Reasons at VIII.2.6 (b)  (emphasis added). 
113 For a much more detailed discussion, see e.g. Sven J.R. Bostyn,  Resolving the patentability of plants produced by 
an essentially biological process conundrum: Squaring the circle? E.I.P.R. 2013, 35(7), 383-396. 
114 The EU “patent package” consists of the Agreement of 19 February 2013 on the Unified Patent Court (UPCA); 
Regulation (EU) No. 1257/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2012 implementing 
enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent protection; and Council Regulation (EU) No. 
1260/2012 of 17 December 2012 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent 
protection with regard to the applicable translation requirement. Cf.  Preliminary set of provisions for the Rules of 
Procedure (“Rules”) of the Unified Patent Court, 17th draft Of 31 October 2014, available at: http://www.unified-
patent-court.org/images/documents/UPC_Rules_of_Procedure_17th_Draft.pdf (last visit 17 March 2015). 
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under the European Patent Convention, including the case law of the Boards of Appeal and especially of 
the EBA of the European Patent Office. As such, ‘Tomato II’ and ‘Broccoli II’ might become relevant in 
the future when product-by-process claims are litigated before the Unified Patent Court.115  
 
 Althought not directly relevant to the current case it should in that context perhaps also be 
mentioned that different interpretations of the scope of protection that should be referred to biologic 
inventions is nothing new in Europe. This can be best demonstrated by the debates surrounding 
patents on human DNA sequences. The somewhat ambivalent drafting of the Directive has resulted 
in diverging national interpretations and implementations of the Directive. In contrast to the EPO 
(see further below), or e.g. Sweden and the U.K.116, some countries in the EU, such as Germany and 
France, have even introduced legislation that categorically limits the scope of product protection for 
certain types of (human) DNA sequences and – as far as France is concerned – even protein 
sequences. These rules oblige applicants to incorporate the specifically identified and disclosed 
industrial application of i.a. (human) DNA sequences into the patent claims and not only the patent 
description. By restricting the patent's scope of protection to the particular application that has been 
sufficiently disclosed, such legislation only grants purpose-bound product protection but no full 
product protection for certain DNA (and/or protein) sequences.117  
 In 2010, this practice appears to have found some support in the Monsanto v. Cefetra 
decision118 of the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”). This seminal decision  
concerning genetically modified plants and seeds has given rise to its own interesting problems and 
unclear issues. Although the Court questioned the scope of protection conferred to genes, no 
principled analysis of the patent-eligibility of human genes patents and the full product protection 
issue could be found.119 Hence, in Europe, the patent-eligibility of human genes still follows the 
statutory principle laid down in Article 5 (2) of the Biotech Directive120. But for how long?  
Having touched upon genetically modified plants, a few words should finally be added 
concerning the combined significance of these two consolidated referals, which is more far-
reaching and relevant for all plant-related inventions. ‘Broccoli I’& ‘Tomato I’ had the impact of 
creating a higher threshold of technical intervention in order for novel and inventive processes 
relating to plant production to be able to avoid the qualification – “essentially biological process”. 
As mentioned above, the EBA defined ‘essentially biological process’ as “a non-microbiological 
process for the production of plants which contains or consists of the steps of sexually crossing the 
                                                     
115 Christian Köster, Additional lessons learned from Tomato II and Broccoli II, available at  
http://www.dennemeyer.com/lessons-tomato-broccoli  (accessed 10 May 2015). 
116 A detailed discussion of the troubled history of the Biotech Directive’s national implementations is provided by T. 
Minssen, KliFoRe, Heft Nr. 3 und 4 (2008), Es bleibet dabei: Eine schwedische Stellungnahme zur europäischen 
Debatte über den absoluten Erzeugnisschutz bei der DNA-Patentierung, p. 93 ff., available at 
http://jura.ku.dk/ciir/ansatte/?pure=da/persons/381631 (last visit 10 April 2015). 
117 For a more thorough discussion of the different national implementations, see T. Minssen, id. , p. 93 ff.  
118 See Case C-428/08 Monsanto Technology LLC v Cefetra BV 6 July 2010 (Grand Chamber) [2010] ECR I-6765. 
119 Although the facts of the case did not concern human DNA and the decision focused mainly on article 9 of the 
Directive.  Yet, the decision also contains general statements on the TRIPS agreement and further provisions of the 
Directive, such as Article 5. For further analysis and criticism of the judgment, cf.  Michael A. Kock, “Court of Justice 
of the European Union Limits Patents on DNA Sequences:  Much Ado About Nothing or The Beginning of Erosion for 
Biotech Patents?”, 11 BSLR 1, 3-12; Overwalle, G. van (2011). “The CJEU Monsanto soybean decision and patent 
scope: As clear as mud”. International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law, 42(1), 1-3, and 
Kock.M.A.“Purpose-bound protection for DNA sequences: in through the back door?”, Journal of Intellectual Property 
Law & Practice 2010 5, 495-513. 
120 Article 5 (2) of the Biotech Directive states: “An element isolated from the human body or otherwise produced by 
means of a technical process, including the sequence or partial sequence of a gene, may constitute a patentable 
invention, even if the structure of that element is identical to that of a natural element”. 
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whole genomes of plants and of subsequently selecting plants”.121 It also added, that  the 
patentability exception cannot be circumvented, merely by adding ”a step of a technical nature 
which serves to enable or assist the performance of the steps of sexually crossing the whole 
genomes of plants or of subsequently selecting plants.”122 Accordingly, a crossing and selecting 
process can only be be patentable if it contains an additional step of technical nature which by itself 
introduces or modifies a trait in the plant genome and which is not the “the result of the mixing of 
the genes of the plants chosen for sexual crossing”.123   
From a functional prespective, it should be pointed out that the legal criteria encompasses 
both conventional crossing and selection methods and genetic engeneering, insofar as the process 
involves the sexual crossing of whole genomes or the recombination of whole genomes of plants. 124 
Emerging technologies, such as synthetic biology, are mostly characterised by cross-disciplinarity 
and the use of a mixture of techniques, some of which may be considered to fall under the 
‘essentially biological’ legal concept. In practice, it has thus become very unlikely for a patent to be 
granted in Europe containing process claims directed to crossing and/or selection steps, even where 
these are subsequent steps in a process involving a vast array of techniques.  
In this sense the present decision in ‘Broccoli II’ and ‘Tomato II’, which allows product and 
product-by-process claims even if obtained by processes that may fall under the ‘essentially 
biological’ proviso has provided many new patent options for the entire plant science community.125 
However, national legislators have chosen a different approach and also on the EU level there is 
still a risk that the CJEU might decide otherwise. From a practical perspective  this implies that 
patent applicants should continue to spend efforts in predominantely using classical product claims 
wherever possible and appropriate. 
 
5. Discussion: The decisions within a wider context 
Throughout this paper we have described and discussed complex patentability issues 
pertaining to the legal interpretation of the EPC, it’s implementing rules and the Biotech Directive. 
It was also pointed out that the legal implications of this EBA ruling escape the boundaries of the 
specific case and Article 53 (b) EPC, both in theoretical and in practical implications for 
prospective patentees.   
                                                     
121 Consolidated cases G 2/07 and G 1/08, Order answer to  question 1 
122 Consolidated cases G 2/07 and G 1/08, Order answer to  question 2 
123 Consolidated cases G 2/07 and G 1/08, Order answer to  question 3 
124 See also Hanna Kompagne, supra n. 108 (adding: “This broad interpretation has created a certain degree of 
uncertainty regarding the future of the European plant industry. In an amicus curiae brief the epi (for one) pointed out 
the possible effects of such an approach on genetically engineered plants: “Should the notion prevail that products of an 
excluded essentially biological process for the production of plants in the sense of G 2/07 are also not patentable, 
genetically engineered plants may also not be patentable under Article 53(b) EPC. Of particular concern are for instance 
mixed processes comprising both technical (i.e. non-biological) and biological steps. Presumably, there is no example 
of a transgenic plant that was marketed without having undergone at least one round of crossing and selection after the 
genetic engineering.  
125 Cf. Id. (”This leads us to another interesting issue: how to design research in a laboratory – and not only in botany 
labs. Genetically modified animals as disease models, for example, are widely used, but there is always room for 
improvement. It is thus perfectly possible to make a GM animal with multiple added traits, whereas the animal is not 
new or does not involve an inventive step per se, although the process leading to the animal contains new and inventive 
technical steps (and crossing of course). It is usually easier, safer, cheaper and more reasonable to cross two different 
GM animals, knowing or hoping that the offspring will have both desired features than to introduce both features into 
the same animal by technical means. However, scientists may be forced to make such animals without crossing, if they 
wish to obtain protection for their invention in Europe”). 
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In that context, it should not be forgotten that this case cannot only be evaluated by legal 
reasoning. It also needs to be discussed within a much larger societal and political context in Europe 
surrounding the fierce debates over emerging scientific and technologic advances: The issue of 
GMO’s and its implications for innovations pertaining to plant science research in emerging fields 
such as synthetic biology, but also for related fields of science with enormous potential, such as 
gene-editing technologies (CRISPR) and biomedical innovations.  
In Europe, the adoption of a precautionary principle or approach concerning regulation of 
emerging technologies has created a paradoxical situation in plant science research and industry. On 
the one side European scientists are at the forefront of research concerning the creation of 
transgenic crop varieties engineered for resistance to specific diseases, enhanced nutritional 
properties and other desirable traits. On the other side, during the past 15 years only two GM crops 
have been approved for commercialization by the European Commission. (EC)126 Monsanto’s 
MON810 maize (resistant to a number of insect herbivores) is currently the only GM crop 
cultivated in the EU. The only other GM crop approval by the European Commission, BASF’s 
“Amflora” GM potato, was annulled by the EU General Court in 2013.127 
In 2006, a World Trade Organization dispute settlement Panel found that that the then 
European Communities (now EU) had applied a general de facto moratorium on the approval of 
biotech products between June 1999 and August 2003, and ruled that, by applying this moratorium, 
the European Communities had acted inconsistently with its international obligations.128  
Strong and constant public opinion opposition to GMO’s has been the major driver behind 
such policy. Partly the lack of approvals can be explained by the fact that until recently every 
member state had to accept and enforce EC approvals of GMO’s. In Case C-36/11129 the CJEU 
clearly stated that has once the use and marketing of a GMO product has been authorized pursuant 
to Regulation 1829/2003 and has been listed in the common catalogue of varieties of agricultural 
plant species under Directive 2002/53/EC, national authorities may not impose additional 
requirements on the grounds of the protection of health or the environment, such as a national 
authorisation procedure. The limited competence of member states to restrict the cultivation of 
GMO crops in their territory, meant the creation of a de facto moratorium over approvals of 
GMO’s, due to strong opposition of some member-states.130 Recently the European Parliament 
agreed to allow individual states to restrict or ban the cultivation of crops containing GMOs on their 
own territory, despite them being approved for use by the European Commission.131 
Symptomatically, the legislation, originally tabled in 2010, was deadlocked for four years due to 
disagreement between pro- and anti-GMO member states, as well as ongoing controversies over the 
                                                     
126 Editorial ’Europe compromises on GM crops’, Nature Plants 1, Article number: 14022 (2015) 
doi:10.1038/nplants.2014.22, Published online 08 January 2015, available at: 
http://www.nature.com/articles/nplants201422  (accessed 10 May 2015). 
127 Case T‑240/10 Hungary v Commission, Judgment of the General Court (First Chamber, extended composition) of 
13 December 2013. ECLI:EU:T:2013:645. 
128 World Trade Organisation Dispute Settlement Pannel, United States v European Communities, European 
Communities — Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, DISPUTE DS291, aAvailable at: 
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds291_e.htm> (accessed 10 May 2015). 
129 Case C-36/11 Pioneer Hi Bred Italia Srl v Ministero delle Politiche agricole alimentari e forestali, Judgment of the 
Court (Fourth Chamber) of 6 September 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:534. 
130 Editorial ’Kicking the can’ Nature biotechnology 33, 111 (2015) doi:10.1038/nbt.3148, Published online 06 
February 2015, available at: <http://www.nature.com/nbt/journal/v33/n2/full/nbt.3148.html> (accessed 10 May 2015). 
131 Directive (EU) 2015/412 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2015 amending Directive 
2001/18/EC as regards the possibility for the Member States to restrict or prohibit the cultivation of genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs) in their territory OJ L 68, 13.3.2015, p. 1–8 
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Convention on Biological Diversity and the Nagoya Protocol.132 At first sight, this new Directive 
would appear to be another setback for the Plant Science community, as it allows members states to 
impose restrictive measures. However, this may actually also open new possibilities, since it is 
hoped that the new legislation will facilitate the approval of GM crops and thus allow its cultivation 
and commercialization in member states with less restrictive views on the subject.  
Negative public perception does not result only from the strong opposition to GMO’s 
campaigned by different environmentalist organisations and political parties. Also farmers 
associations have joined the debate, opposing the patentability of plant related inventions as a 
matter of concern that such patents will foster market concentration, making farmers and other 
stakeholders of the food supply chain increasingly dependent on a small number of large 
international corporations. Consumer protection and consumers rights to information also form part 
of the flagship issues nourturing the public debate.133 Thus, it is not surprising that the EBA’s 
decision in the consolidated cases G 2/12 ‘Tomato II’ and G 2/13 ‘Broccoli II’ has generated 
reactions of alarm and calls for revision of EU Patent Law, among accusations to the EPO of 
favouring the arguments and interests of giant agrochemical companies. The decision has been 
criticised as offering a gateway to completely bypass the provisions of the Biotech Directive, the 
Berne Declaration and SWISSAID commented that over 7,500 patent applications on plants and 
5,000 applications for animals have been filed at the EPO, 3,800 patents have been granted, 120 of 
which relate to conventional selection processes, while around 1,000 applications are pending.134 It 
is thus, likely that such patents may continue to be object of opposition procedures at the EPO, as it 
is reasonable to predict that increasingly infringement/invalidation actions concerning national 
patents will surface in national courts135 and eventually reach the CJEU.  
                                                     
132 Parliament backs GMO opt-out for EU member states, Press release - Environment − 13-01-2015, available at 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/content/20150109IPR06306/> ; Cf. Convention on Biological 
Diversity, 1760 UNTS 79; 31 ILM 8818 (1992); and Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and 
Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from Their Utilization to Convention on Biological Diversity, Nagoya, 29 
October 2010, available at http://www.cbd.int/cop10/doc  (accessed 10 March 2015). (accessed 10 May 2015). 
133 See for example the position of The international coalition of  No Patents on Seeds! calling for a revision of 
European Patent Law to exclude breeding material, plants and animals and food derived thereof from patentability. 
According to their website, the coalition is supported by several hundred other organisations, including:  Bionext 
(Netherlands), The Berne Declaration (Switzerland), GeneWatch (UK), Greenpeace, Misereor (Germany), 
Development Fund (Norway), No Patents on Life (Germany), Red de Semillas (Spain), Rete Semi Rurali (Italy), 
Reseau Semences Paysannes (France) and Swissaid (Switzerland). In <http://no-patents-on-seeds.org/> (accessed 10 
May 2015). 
134 Christoph Then  and Ruth Tippe ‘European Patent Office at Crossroads: Report about Patents on Plants and Animals 
Granted in 2011’,  Coalition  No Patents on Seeds, March 2012, available at: 
ttps://www.bernedeclaration.ch/news/european_patent_office_at_crossroads_report_about_patents_on_plants_and_ani
mals_granted_in_2011/ (accessed 10 May 2015) 
135 An example can be found in the recent ‘radish Netherlands case’. Taste of Natures developed a seedling of a radish 
being characterized by a high level of anthocyanin (antioxidant), protected by European patent EP 1 290 938 (“EP 
‘938”), as validated in the Netherlands. The patent inter alia relates to methods for the production of the seedling. 
Although the final decision on the merits was eventually based on matters of lack of  novelty, on 31 January 2012 the 
judge in summary injunction proceedings of the District Court of The Hague rejected Taste of Nature claim for 
infringement against Cresco, and  considered the patent  invalid in view of the exclusion of patentability under article 
53(b) EPC. The court reasons that the method was unpatentable for being an essentially biological process, but also 
considers that a product directly obtained by using that method, would likely be unpatentable because a method claim 
also protects the product directly obtained using that method. Taste of Nature Holding B.V. v. Cresco Handels-B.V., 
proceedings on merits, District Court The Hague, The Netherlands, 8 May 2013, Case No. / Docket No. 416501 / KG 
ZA 12-452decision of District court of the Hague, decision of 8 of May Taste of Nature B.V. v. Cresto Handels B.V. 
Unofficial English translation available at: <http://www.eplawpatentblog.com/eplaw/2013/06/nl-taste-of-nature-
cresco.html> (accessed 10 May 2015). 
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Although the EBA decision is favourable to patentees by applying a narrow understanding on 
the scope of the exception, an eventual referral to the CJEU may once again change the 
patentability landscape in Europe. The CJEU is not bound in any way by the decisions of the EBA 
and because it uses different interpretative methods and resorts to different sets of sources of law it 
may reach a different decision. In this respect, any legislative initiatives by the EU parliament in 
this area may influence the outcome of such an eventual referral. 
It has also been reported that, from a regulatory perspective new techniques in plant breeding 
linked to contemporary genetics and genomics challenge the boundaries between GMOs and 
conventional breeding. It may be increasingly difficult to define whether the technologies used give 
rise to GMOs as defined by current EU legislation.136  
Another source of concern for prospective patentees in Europe is the possibility of a spill over 
effect of the GMO’s negative public perception into emerging scientific and technological fields, 
such as Synthetic Biology and genetic editing, because distinctions and clear boundaries are 
difficult to establish, both in scientific terms and in the public eye. For example, in 2011 a group of 
Non-Govermental Organisations (NGO’S) comprising 111 environmental, watchdog, and other 
organizations released a report with specific regulatory recommendations for new biological 
techniques for building and remaking organisms for research and commercial uses ranging from 
medicines to biofuels. These NGO’s described synthetic biology as "an extreme form of genetic 
engineering” and called for a moratorium on its use.137 More recently, two distinct groups of high 
profile scientists have called for a moratorium on editing germ line genome with CRISPR-Cas9 and 
zinc-finger nucleases.138 In their Nature and Science articles, these two groups advised that research 
which produces heritable edits to the human genome must not proceed until the risks are better 
understood. The technologies in question have shown great potential as tools for selectively 
targeting genes or sections of DNA f or editing and could prove as revolutionary as recombinant 
DNA technology. Scientists worry that use of these technologies without a larger public debate may 
cause blind negative public perception concerning all possible applications of the technology. 
Editing of the human germ line is already illegal in several jurisditions and heavily regulated in 
others.139 The patentability of such technologies is also subject to restrictions codified in the 
European Biotech Directive and recent applications in plant sciences carried out at the University of 
Copenhagen have stimulated a fierce international debate.140  
                                                     
136 Article 2 (2) “"genetically modified organism (GMO)" means an organism, with the exception of human beings, in 
which the genetic material has been altered in a way that does not occur naturally by mating and/or natural 
recombination” Article 2 (2) Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 March 2001 on 
the deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified organisms and repealing Council Directive 
90/220/EEC - Commission Declaration, OJ L 106 , 17/04/2001 P. 0001 – 0039. 
137 ’The Potential Impacts of Synthetic Biology on the Conservation & Sustainable Use of Biodiversity: A Submission 
to the Convention on Biological Diversity’s Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical & Technological Advice” 
Submitted by: The International Civil Society Working Group on Synthetic Biology Consisting of: Action Group On 
Erosion, Technology and Concentration (ETC Group), Econexus, Friends of the Earth USA, International Centre for 
Technology Assesment, The Sustainability Council of New Zealand. (2011), Available at: 
http://www.etcgroup.org/sites/www.etcgroup.org/files/publication/pdf_file/cbdsynbiocsosubm.pdf  (accessed 10 May 
2015) 
138 Lanphier E, Urnov F, Haecker SE, Werner M, Smolenski J. Don’t edit the human germ line. Nature. 519, 410-411 
(2015); Baltimore D, Berg P, Botchan M, et al. A prudent path forward for genomic engineering and germline gene 
modification. ScienceDOI: 10.1126/science.aab1028   
139 Regarding Europe, see for example the restriction imposed by Article 13, Council of Europe Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: 
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (Oviedo Convention),  
140 Art. 6 (2) Biotech Directive. Cf. Gina Kolata , A Proposal to Modify Plants Gives GMO Debate New Life, The New 
York Times, May 28, 2015, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/29/a-proposal-to-modify-plants-gives-gmo-
debate-new-life.html?_r=0 (accessed 5 June 2015). 
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On the other hand: While Europe remains reticent in accepting the benefits and possibilities 
opened by plant science, crucial developments - such as population growth141, the rapid 
development of the global south and the resulting increase in consumption - imply that more 
energy, food and raw materials will have to be produced by the industry and energy sectors with 
lesser occupation of soil surface.142 Emerging technologies may offer new solutions and the 
acceptance of GMO’s and emerging plant science may become instrumental in solving the major 
challenges that mankind will face throughout the 21th century.  
 
6. Concluding remarks 
The title of this paper encompasses two basic interrogations. First, we attempted to address  
the broader implications of the ‘Broccoli’ & ‘Tomato’ patent prosecution saga not only for the 
patentability of conventionally produced products, but also for genetic modified organisms and 
emerging technologies, such as synthetic biology and gene editing. Second, we considered whether 
this is really the end or just a mere prelude to further patent litigation in Europe. None of these 
questions has a clear answer. Technology is developing towards multidisciplinarity and 
convergence, while patent law struggles to characterise and establish legal boundaries.  
In essence the decisions have confirmed that claims directed to novel and inventive plants 
obtained by methods which include breeding steps, as opposed to plant varieties, should in principle 
be allowable under the EPC, irrespective of whether claimed in a product per se or product-by-
process format. Patent protection will only be categorically denied if the product is an individual 
“plant variety”. This outcome is of course very positive news for patent applicants engaged in 
innovative plant breeding, and – as it was pointed out before – it may even affect the areas of GMO 
research and Synthetic Biology. 
The systematically plausible solution found by the EPO has the merit of offering a way 
forward by allowing product and product-by-process claims even where the process may be – or 
may not -considered essentially biologic. Thus the debate concerning such delimitations becomes - 
at least on the EPO level - less imminent, which in turn provides certainty, innovation incentives 
and business perspectives for patent applicants. At the same time, however, the controversy over the 
merits of the EPO’s approach is probably not over. Opposition to patentability of any technology 
that alters life forms remains very strong in Europe. This in combination with the systemic 
characteristics of the European patent system and a probably approaching CJEU decision leaves the 
distinct impression that “the thrill is not gone” and that prospective patentees may soon face new 
legal challenges looming over  fruits and vegetables. From a practical perspective – and 
notwithstanding the more liberal EPO approach with regard to product by process claims  - this also 
means that in order to minimize risks applicants should draft conventional product claims wherever 
possible.  
More generally, this wide and complex context requires all stakeholders to engage in a public 
debate on the broader questions that are at stake here, such as: Who drives innovation and who 
benefits from it?; Why?; What are the long term effects of any decision on patent eligibility?; What 
are the alternatives?; and: What are the underlying reasons for the opposition against plan-related 
patents?; How should the opposition and potential dangers be adressed? Where are risks for public 
misunderstanding and conflations and how can these be dealt with? 
                                                     
141 It is estimated that by mid-century the earth population will reach around 9 billion people. 
142  Sharp, Philip A, “Presidential Address: Meeting global challenges: Discovery and innovation through convergence. 
Integrate biology, physics, engineering, and social science to innovate” 19 December 2014,VOL 346,  ISSUE 6216 . 
Available at: <http://www.sciencemag.org/content/346/6216/1468.full.pdf?sid=c625dbb7-23ab-4606-a037-
00921c80b7eb> (accessed May 10, 2015). 
Published in 34 Biotechnology Law Report, Number 3, pp. 81-98 (2015). 
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With regard to patent law, these debates should be based on correct information and  
understanding of patent law as a time-limited  “negative exclusionary right”, which must be 
differentiated from regulatory law. It also appears more important than ever to explain the exclusive 
effect of alternative or complementary forms of protection, such as plant variety rights, vis-à-vis 
patent rights. This requires to emphasize the systematic organization and rationale of other 
patentability requirements, such as novelty, inventive step and sufficient disclosure, as well as their 
mitigating effects of on the number and scope of claims that are actually being granted in the area. 
In this context, we believe it to be of vital importance to remember and communicate that patent 
law should not be misused to address or even solve problems that it was never created to solve. This 
notion is particularly important to us since it seems as if patent challenges are often used as a 
vehicle to express opposition against plant science and GMOs as such.   
Be that as it may, in summary the Broccoli and Tomato patent saga is indeed a juicy tale of 
plant patenting. For the first time in 40 years the European Patent Office has accepted to conduct a 
consolidated sequel to previous consolidated decisions concerning the same inventions (albeight to 
amended claims). In the process the EBA closed the door to process claims for conventional 
biological methods, and opened the window for product and product-by-process claims. It is by any 
standart a spectacular finale. However, with regard to the varying national interpretations of the EU 
Biotech Directive, we believe that ‘it ain’t over’ until the CJEU ‘sings’. One may therefore ask 
whether we will soon be viewing a remake. 
 
Post scriptum 
After completion of this paper, the European Commission expressed that it did not share the 
opinion of the EPO’s Enlarged Board of Appeal (cf. the Interpretative Notice from November 
2016). Like several EU member states, such as France, Germany, Italy and Netherlands, the 
Commission found that under the EU Biotech Directive products obtained by essentially biological 
processes should not receive patent protection. This intervention by the Commission, the 
divergences between the interpretation of the EPC and the Biotech Directive,  and the need for 
legal certainty and harmonization, led the EPO to stay ex officio all the proceedings in which the 
decision depended entirely on the patentability of a plant or animal obtained by an essentially 
biological process. Then, on June 29, 2017, the Administrative Council of the EPO decided to 
amend Rules 27 and 28 of the Implementing Regulation. According to these amendments products 
(animals or plants) obtained exclusively from essentially biological process are now effectively 
excluded from patentability. Notwithstanding that this contradicts the earlier decisions by the 
Enlarged Board of Appeal, these amendments apply to European patent applications filed on or 
after July 1, 2017, as well as to European patent applications and European patents pending at that 
time. 
A first analysis of these changes is provided by Florica Rus at: 
http://ipkitten.blogspot.dk/2017/07/more-on-broccoli-tomatoes-and.html  
 
